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AGAINST DIVINE TRUTHMAKER SIMPLICITY
Noël B. Saenz

Divine Simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no
metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic
properties. Recently, Jeffrey Brower has put forward an account of divine
simplicity that has it that God is the truthmaker for all intrinsic essential
predications about him. This allows Brower to preserve the intuitive thought
that God is not a property but a concrete being. In this paper, I provide two
objections to Brower’s account that are meant to show that whatever merits
this account of divine simplicity has, plausibility is not one of them.

Divine simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no
metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic
properties. Now modern discussions of divine simplicity have tended to
focus exclusively on a version of divine simplicity that makes God identical to a property.1 But, as has been stressed before, saying that God is
a property is highly implausible.2 Jeffrey Brower, a proponent of divine
simplicity, agrees when he says
the strategy they adopt [the strategy of making God identical to a property]
for making sense of simplicity appears not only extreme, but also extremely
ad hoc. Indeed, it would seem that any account of simplicity that could render the doctrine coherent without giving up the traditional conception of
properties would be preferable to them.3

1
William Mann, “Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 18 (1982), 451–471; William Mann,
“Simplicity and Properties: A Reply to Morris,” Religious Studies 22 (1986), 343–353; Brian
Leftow, “Is God an Abstract Object?,” Noûs 24 (1990), 581–598; William F. Vallicella, “Divine
Simplicity: A New Defense,” Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), 508–525; William F. Vallicella, “On
Property Self-Exemplification: Rejoinder to Miller,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), 478–481;
Katherin Rogers, “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 32 (1996),
165–186.
2
For the locus classicus of this objection, see Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Marquette University Press, 1980), 47. A similar objection has also been raised by Richard Gale,
On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23–34.
3
Jeffrey Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008), 11.
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I concur. There is just not much going for this view.4 So let’s take a look at
another, fairly recent, account of divine simplicity. And here we turn to
Brower.5
According to Brower, there is no need to identify God with a property
in order to make sense of divine simplicity. Identifying him as the truthmaker for intrinsic essential predications about him will do.6 In order to see
what leads him to say this, we need to get clear on what Brower takes the
doctrine of divine simplicity to be. He says
the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity can be expressed in terms of the
requirements it places on divine predications. At least as understood by the
medievals, what this doctrine tells us is that if a predication such as “God
is good” is true, then there exists an entity, God’s goodness, that is identical
with God; likewise, if “God is powerful” is true, then God’s power exists and
is identical with God; and so on for other such true divine predications.7

Summing this up, Brower says that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity is expressed by, and requires nothing more than, the following:
Simplicity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
Brower then argues that Simplicity is ontologically neutral with respect to
what God’s F-ness is. He says
So understood, the doctrine of divine simplicity takes no stand whatsoever
on the precise nature of the entities with which it identifies God. It does
4
For a way of understanding divine simplicity that perhaps avoids this objection, see
Eleonore Stump, “God’s Simplicity,” in The Oxford Handbook to Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and
Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Stump, in describing Aquinas’ view
of simplicity, says that “sometimes we have to characterize God with abstract terms—and so
we say that God is love—and sometimes we have to characterize him with concrete terms—
and so we say that God is loving” (142). So, according to Stump’s Aquinas, it is acceptable to
say that God is abstract (like a property), so long as this does not rule out God being concrete.
So there is something false about conceiving of God as abstract alone or as concrete alone
(consider, using Stump’s example, that there is something false about conceiving of light as
a wave alone or a particle alone). Given this view of divine simplicity (what Stump calls “a
quantum metaphysics”), the objection considered in the main text has little bite (though this
is only because we are now, at least in large part, mysterians with respect to the kind of thing
God is). As an anonymous referee rightly points out, this shows us that “getting clear on
what the doctrine is makes a difference to its evaluation.”
5
I have been told that the view to be presented is actually quite faithful to the view that
Aquinas and other medievals had of divine simplicity. If this is true, then this view is far
from being a recent account of divine simplicity (even if it is, as Jeffrey Brower made clear in
personal correspondence, a contemporary statement of it).
6
Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity”; Jeffrey Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,”
in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009). For others who have it that God is the truthmaker for his
intrinsic essential predications, see Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey Brower, “A Theistic Argument against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity),” in Oxford
Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 2, ed. Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006);
Alexander R. Pruss, “On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy
of Religion, Vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Kwanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
7
Brower, “Making Sense,” 5–6.
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assume that there are (or at least could be) entities corresponding to expressions such as “God’s goodness,” “God’s power,” and “God’s wisdom.”
Nonetheless, it says nothing about the specific ontological category to which
they belong.8

From this, Brower concludes that in order to avoid identifying God with
a property, all we have to do is accept the intuitively plausible truthmaker
account of predication:
Truthmaker: If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then
a’s F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker
for [< a is F >].9
That Truthmaker avoids identifying God with a property should be obvious. For instead of identifying a’s F-ness with a property, Truthmaker
identifies it with that which makes true < a is F > and there is no reason to
think that the truthmaker, at least in this case, is a property. As Brower says,
“to characterize an entity as a truthmaker is to characterize it in terms of
a certain metaphysical function or role,” viz., that of making some proposition true.10 This, according to Brower, “leaves open the possibility that
truthmakers can belong to ontological categories of very different kinds,
including both concrete individuals (such as persons) and properties.”11
Furthermore, with respect to intrinsic essential predications such as
< Plato is a human > and contingent predications such as < Plato is wise >,
Brower thinks that all that is required as a truthmaker for the former, but
not the latter, is Plato.12 That it is plausible that only Plato is required to
make true < Plato is a human > is due to its being the case that part of what
it is to be Plato is to be human; being human is essential to Plato. However,
this line of reasoning does not hold for < Plato is wise > since being wise
is not part of what it is to be Plato. Now since the reason for thinking that
Plato is a truthmaker for his essential predications generalizes, we can
say that concrete individuals are, in general, truthmakers for their true
intrinsic essential predications.
So Simplicity, when coupled with Truthmaker, and given what was
just said concerning intrinsic essential predications, entails that God is
identical with the truthmakers for his intrinsic essential predications. This
result is not absurd. As Brower says
Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 109.
I will use “< p >” to stand for “the proposition that p.”
10
Brower, “Making Sense,” 18.
11
Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 111.
12
Brower does not elaborate on what he means by “essential.” But I take it that in order
for a predication to be an essential predication, it must be a predication that is, in some
sense, central to what the thing is (see Kit Fine, “Essence and Modality,” Philosophical Perspectives 8 [1994], 1–16; Michael Gorman, “The Essential and the Accidental,” Ratio 18 [2005],
276–289). So it is not enough that some predication of x is necessarily true of x in order for
that predication to be an essential predication of x. If we want an essential predication of x,
that predication needs to be, at least in part, central to, or about the identity of, x.
8
9
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the truthmaker interpretation goes considerable distance toward rendering
the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. On this interpretation, for example, the doctrine does not require that God is identical with each of his
properties, and hence is himself a property. In fact, it does not even require
that God has any properties at all (in the ontologically loaded sense of exemplifiables). On the contrary, all the doctrine requires is that, for every true
intrinsic divine predication, there is a truthmaker and God is identical with
that truthmaker. But there is nothing obviously absurd about that.13

So appealing to Truthmaker both avoids the absurd result that God is
identical with a property and allows God to be a concrete individual. This
is good.
But is it good enough? No. For even though I am willing to agree with
Brower that his brand of simplicity, which I will henceforth call Divine
Truthmaker Simplicity (“DTS” for short), is more believable than the brand
that identifies God with a property, I think there are good reasons to think
it implausible. So in each of § 1 and § 2, I will provide an argument for
thinking that DTS is implausible.14 In § 3, I will show why these arguments
are useless against a view according to which God is complex.
1. The Truthmaker Argument
That God is the truthmaker for his intrinsic essential predications would
seem to rely on the following principle:
Essential: For any concrete x, if < p > is an intrinsic essential predication
of x, then x makes < p > true.
But why accept Essential? It does not strike me as obvious, and Brower’s
only defense of it requires appealing to its seeming plausibility. Brower
says
it does seem plausible to think that a concrete individual can be the truthmaker for a proper subset of its true essential predications—namely, each of
its true intrinsic essential predications.15

Turning to God, Brower says
This interpretation of simplicity seems promising if we focus on predications such as “God is divine,” “God is good,” and “God is powerful.” For
in each of these cases, God can plausibly be regarded as their truthmaker.16

So for Brower, Essential appears plausible and this, it would seem, is why
he accepts it. But I do not have this plausibility intuition. And even if I did,
I would reject it. Here is why. Truthmakers are supposed to be that which
Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 112.
For an argument against DTS that differs from mine, see William F. Vallicella, “Divine
Simplicity,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/divine-simplicity/ .
15
Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 111.
16
Brower, “Making Sense,” 19.
13
14
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gives a metaphysical ground of truth, and grounds are supposed to be explanatory in nature.17 That is, if x makes < p > true, then x (or x’s existence)
metaphysically explains why < p > is true.18 As Brower himself says
when a predication of the form “a is F” is true, there must be something that
makes it true—or better, some thing (or plurality of things) which explains its
truth or in virtue of which it is true. As these qualifications indicate, the notion of “making” at work here is not causal, but explanatory.19

So if x fails to metaphysically explain (or as I will sometimes just say, explain)
that < p > is true, then x fails to make < p > true. This tells against Essential.
To use Brower’s example, take an intrinsic essential predication of Plato,
< Plato is a human > and ask “what makes this proposition true?” Notice
that the answer cannot be Plato. Why? Because saying that this proposition
is true in virtue of Plato or that Plato makes it true, and therefore explains
why it is true that he is human, is explanatorily empty. Listing Plato as that
which makes true < Plato is a human > is of no help in telling me what it is
that metaphysically explains that it is true that he is a human. Notice that
I am not simply claiming that I cannot see how Plato explains the truth of
< Plato is a human > (which, if true, could be a mere epistemic shortcoming
on my part). Rather, I am claiming that I can see that he doesn’t explain it.
Plato, the concrete being, is just not rich enough to provide, on his own,
a metaphysical ground of the truth of < Plato is a human >.20 However, if
the answer to the above question is that the proposition is true because
Plato instantiates being a human, or that the state of affairs of Plato’s being a
human explains that it is true that Plato is a human, then I have been told
something that is explanatorily helpful.21 I have been told not merely that
17
For others who accept this claim, see, inter alia, Gideon Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction,” in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, ed. Bob
Hale and Aviv Hoffman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Jonathan Schaffer, “The
Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker,” Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010),
307–324; Paul Audi, 2012. “A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding,” in
Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed. Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Clark and David
Liggins, “Recent Work on Grounding,” Analysis (2012), 1–12; Kit Fine, “A Guide to Ground,”
in Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed. Fabrice Correia and
Benjamin Schnieder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ross Cameron, “Truthmakers,” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, ed. Michael Glanzberg (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, forthcoming).
18
The use of “metaphysical” here is to contrast the kind of explanation under discussion
with causal explanations. That Jill threw the ball provides a causal, and not a metaphysical,
explanation for the breaking of the window. That Plato is wise provides a metaphysical, and
not a causal, explanation for the truth of < Plato is wise >.
19
Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 110.
20
It is important to note here that there needs to be more to a metaphysical explanation
than necessitation. Plato necessitates that < 2 + 1 = 3 > is true. But of course, he does not explain it. So the mere fact that Plato necessitates (as he surely does) that < Plato is a human >
is true does very little, if anything, with respect to establishing him as an explanation for the
truth of < Plato is a human >.
21
Of course, it is no part of truthmaker theory that for every predicate, there is a corresponding property. So perhaps there is no property being a human. No problem, for even
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Plato exists, but something about how Plato intrinsically is. And how Plato
intrinsically is, as opposed to whether Plato is, metaphysically explains
(and so grounds) that a proposition about how Plato intrinsically is has the
property of being true.
All this should be rather unsurprising. Intrinsic predications involve
descriptions of the world. They involve saying that the world (or one of
its inhabitants) is some way. But then it should come as no surprise that
whatever makes such predications true must involve how the world in
fact is (or how one of its inhabitants in fact is). There needs to be a kind
match between what is true and its truthmaker. If it is true that something
is some way, then what makes it true must be structured in the right kind
of way if it is to explain why the predication applies to it. Plato is just not
structured in the way he needs to be if he is to explain why “is a human”
applies to him.22 But then Plato cannot explain why < Plato is a human >
is true.
I have been given the following response: For the advocate of DTS,
pointing to Plato as that which makes true < Plato is a human > is a way of
pointing to the essence of Plato, and that essence of Plato comes pre-built
with what you are calling “how things (intrinsically and essentially) are.”
The essence of Plato is pre-built as being a human. Pointing to Plato, then,
is a way of pointing to the truthmaker.
But it is not at all clear how this helps matters, and for three reasons.
First, even if pointing to Plato is a way of pointing to the truthmaker, it
does not follow that Plato is the truthmaker (consider, pointing to a picture
of Plato can be a way of pointing to him, but it does not follow from this
that the picture is Plato). Second, how should we understand “pre-built”?
On its most natural reading, the thought here is that if essences come prebuilt with how things intrinsically and essentially are, then the essence is
given to us as being composed by how the thing it is an essence of intrinsically and essentially is. But with respect to God, this cannot be the case
if divine simplicity is true. God is his essence, and since God exhibits no
metaphysical complexity, then neither does his essence. But his essence
would if it were composed by how God intrinsically and essentially is.
So until a meaning is given to “pre-built” that does not entail that God
is complex, the present response is, at best, inconclusive. Third, even if
how things intrinsically and essentially are is pre-built into the essences of
if you think that this property does not exist, the point still holds. What we need here is
something about how Plato is (a state of affairs or trope), and not merely that Plato is.
22
Notice that this is not to deny that Plato is structured. For suppose we accept a constituent ontology according to which concrete objects like Plato have properties as constituents.
This is perfectly consistent with saying that Plato alone is not structured in the right kind of
way to make < Plato is a human > true. Of course, if we accept a constituent ontology, there
is a sense in which Plato has “within himself” that which makes true < Plato is a human >,
namely, the state of affairs Plato’s being human or the trope Plato’s human-ness. But this is not
tantamount to saying that Plato himself is what which explains that < Plato is a human > is
true. If anything, it is to concede that Plato is not the truthmaker but that a state of affairs or
trope (things fundamentally different from Plato) “within” Plato are.
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those very things, it does not follow that the things that have the essences
are good explanations for truths about their essences. That is, even if one
could point to the essence of a thing simply by pointing to the thing that
has the essence, it does not follow that the thing is a good explanation for
the truth of an intrinsic essential predication about the thing. Explanation
is hyper-intensional. If x explains y, and x is intimately associated with z
such that x necessitates z and vice-versa (as the instantiated essence of a
thing necessitates the thing and vice-versa), it does not follow that z also
explains y. It would follow if this intimate association were identity (which
is precisely what divine simplicity theorists will say since according to
divine simplicity, God is his essence). But this is, in large part, what my
argument is questioning. Plato does not explain certain truths about how
he intrinsically and essentially is. That Plato is some intrinsic, essential,
way does. So Plato is not identical to how he intrinsically and essentially
is. Therefore, on pain of begging the question, the present response has
little to no force against the present objection.
Here is a related response.23 Suppose we take the old-fashioned definition of a human as a rational animal. If, then, you beheld Plato himself—not
just his bare existence, of course—you would or could “see” that he’s rational, and that he’s an animal, and that such are essential to him. So Plato
does provide enough—if only one can understand him well enough—to
explain the truth that Plato is a human. This is so even if it would be explanatorily empty for us to merely point at Plato in order to explain the
truth that Plato is a human. Nonetheless, it would seem that the grounds
of explanation are there, in Plato.
But notice that, according to this response, to behold Plato himself requires to behold not just Plato, but how Plato essentially is. It is to behold
that Plato is rational, and an animal, and that these are essential to him.
So of course Plato, when beheld in this way, provides enough to explain the
truth that Plato is a human since to behold Plato in this way is just to consider how Plato essentially is. So what is doing the explanatory work here
is not really Plato, but how Plato essentially is. This is precisely what I am
arguing for. In agreement with this response, Plato does provide enough
(by being essentially human) even if Plato is not enough. In agreement
with this response, the ground of the truth that Plato is a human is there,
in Plato (because Plato is essentially human), even if this ground is not
Plato himself. So really, this response is in complete agreement with me in
suggesting that what Plato provides, or what is in Plato (namely, his being
essentially some way), as opposed to Plato himself, does explain that it is
true that he is a human.
So, I claim, it is not Plato, but rather how Plato is, that explains why a
proposition about how Plato is has the property of being true. A proposition about how Plato is has the property of being true in virtue of how
Plato is and not in virtue of Plato. So Essential, which is required for DTS,
23

I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this response.
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is false. DTS is therefore in trouble. Now Essential (perhaps) has some
recent historical support in the work of David Armstrong, a champion
of truthmaking.24 Therefore, one cannot be accused of engaging in completely aberrant theorizing about truthmaking if they accept Essential. But
of course, the point still holds. Insofar as truthmakers are supposed to
metaphysically explain why truths are true (as Brower himself accepts),
merely appealing to a thing in order to explain why intrinsic essential
claims about that thing are true is to provide a truthmaker that is too
course-grained. We (including Armstrong) need to dig deeper, and provide more structure in our ontology, if we want satisfactory truthmakers
here.
Notice that this argument against Essential does not call
Truthmaker: If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then
a’s F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker
for [< a is F >].
into question. It is consistent with everything said above that a’s F-ness
makes true < a is F > so long as (at least in many cases) a’s F-ness is not
identical to a.25 For example, it is consistent with everything said above
that Plato’s human-ness makes true < Plato is a human > so long as Plato’s
human-ness is not identical to Plato. This shows us that there exists a tension between Truthmaker and
24
David M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 98. It is worth noting here that even before Armstrong came on the truthmaking scene,
Mulligan, Simons, and Smith already had it that things are not truthmakers for intrinsic
essential truths about them (see Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, “TruthMakers,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44 (1984), 300). So there is even earlier
recent historical support for rejecting Essential.
25
An anonymous referee suggested the following case as a counter-example to the claim
just made in the main text:
It is true that goodness is good.
The goodness of goodness makes < Goodness is good > true.
The goodness of goodness is identical to goodness.
But I think this case fails. Here is why: The third claim, that the goodness of goodness is
identical to goodness, is plausible because we are taking “the goodness of goodness” to refer
simply to the property that goodness, in this case, instantiates, namely goodness. Obviously,
if “the goodness of goodness” refers simply to the property goodness, then the goodness of
goodness is identical to goodness. But if so, then it is no longer obvious that the goodness
of goodness makes < Goodness is good > true. This is so because it is by no means obvious
that the property goodness makes it true that goodness is good. Indeed, the very same argument for thinking that Plato does not make it true that Plato is a human because Plato fails
to explain why < Plato is a human > is true works in this case. What explains the truth of
< Goodness is good > is something about how goodness is. We need goodness to be some way,
namely good, in order for it to be the case that < Goodness is good > is true. Appealing simply
to goodness in order to explain that it is true that goodness is some way is explanatorily
unsatisfactory. So if “the goodness of goodness” refers simply to the property goodness, then
the second claim in the above case is suspect. However, if “the goodness of goodness” does
not refer simply to the property goodness, then the third claim in the above case is suspect.
So “the goodness of goodness” refers either to the property goodness or it does not. If it does,
then the second claim is false. If it does not, then the third claim is false. Either way, the above
case involves a false claim.
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Simplicity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
According to Truthmaker, God’s omnibenevolence makes < God is
omnibenevolent > true. But according to Simplicity, God’s omnibenevolence = God. However, God does not make < God is omnibenevolent > true
for the very same reason that Plato does not make < Plato is a human >
true. Merely pointing to God as an answer to “what makes < God is omnibenevolent > true?” is explanatorily empty. As with Plato, what we need
here is something about how God is and not merely whether God is. So
God does not explain why < God is omnibenevolent > is true. But then,
given Simplicity, neither does God’s omnibenevolence, which contradicts
Truthmaker.26 Therefore, either Truthmaker or Simplicity has to go. But
since both are required by DTS, then DTS must go as well.
2. The Divine Predications Argument
There exists a kind of priority ordering between God’s intrinsic essential
predications.27 God’s intrinsic essential predications are not simply a list
of predications every one of which is independent from every other. They
are rather a unified and elegant lot. There is an order amongst them such
that the truth of some “flow” from the truth of other more basic ones.
Brower himself accepts this when he accepts that
(1) God is wise because God is divine.28
That God is divine is more basic or fundamental than that God is wise.
That God is divine explains that God is wise.29 Alternatively, it might
strike many that the reversal is true

26
Notice that it does not, in order to make it plausible that God explains that < God is
omnibenevolent > is true, help to refer to God with the name “God’s omnibenevolence.” For
notice the analogous move one could make in the case of Plato. One could decide to refer to
Plato with the name “Plato’s human-ness” and say that it is Plato’s human-ness that makes
< Plato is a human > true. But it does not follow from deciding to call Plato a certain name that
Plato is now a plausible explanation for the truth of < Plato is a human >. So it does not follow
from referring to God with the name “God’s omnibenevolence” that God is now a plausible
explanation for the truth of < God is omnibenevolent >.
27
Be careful! Predications about God are not properties of God. The former involve propositions describing God whereas the latter involve the ways God is.
28
Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity,” 117. Notice that claims like (1) cannot involve properties of God since, according to DTS, God plausibly lacks such properties. Instead, they
involve predications about God. Another way to state (1) is as follows:
< God is wise > is true because < God is divine > is true.
For stylistic reasons, I have decided, in (1) and (2), to express dependency claims concerning
predications about God without the use of angle brackets and the property of being true.
29
Brower accepts other similar claims when he says
For as the foregoing list makes clear, the God of traditional theism possesses intellectual states like knowledge (in virtue of which he is omniscient), and appetitive
states like desires or volitions (in virtue of which he is perfectly good or loving).
(“Simplicity and Aseity,” 106)
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(2) God is divine, at least in part, because God is wise
That God is wise is more basic or fundamental than that God is divine.
That God is wise partly explains that God is divine.
Now what we have here between (1) and (2) are jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive, positions. Jointly exhaustive because it is just false that
the truth of < God is wise > is not in any way explanatorily related to the
truth of < God is divine >. Focusing on (1), notice how natural it is to think
that God is wise (and good, and powerful, and just) because God is divine.
As Brower says
Traditional theists standardly derive the intrinsic divine attributes (or better,
the truth of predications involving them) from their understanding of the
divine nature. That is to say, they take God to be not only good, powerful,
wise, and just, but to be all these things in virtue of being divine.30

Mutually exclusive because (1) and (2) cannot both be true on pain of
violating the irreflexivity of explanation. If God is wise because God is
divine, and God is divine, at least in part, because God is wise, then it follows, by the transitivity of explanation (or partial explanation), that God
is wise, at least in part, because God is wise. But this is false. That God
is wise is not at all explained, even in part, by itself. So we must choose
either (1) or (2) and we cannot choose both. Let us, for sake of argument,
accept (1) (the argument to follow would work just as well if we instead
accepted (2)).
Here is a question everyone, and so the divine simplicity theorist, has
to answer: what explains the pattern of dependency among the truth of
the predications expressed in (1)? That is, why is it that the truth of one
predication, that God is wise, depends on the truth of another, that God
is divine, rather than the other way around? In short, why (1) rather than
(2)? This question must have an answer. That one predication is true in
virtue of another predication is not a fundamental fact. Predications, and
their exemplifying a dependence order, are not brute, primitive, entities or
facts. Perhaps there is nothing that explains why certain properties obtain
in virtue of other properties, but predications are not properties. That a
predication is true in virtue of another predication is a semantic fact and
semantic facts are not (at least generally) part of the fundamental story of
the world (indeed, it is precisely this intuition which undergirds the belief
that a proposition’s being true (which is a semantic fact) requires a truthmaker (something in the world that metaphysically explains its truth)). So
the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) must have an explanation on
pain of allowing (1), which is a semantic fact, to go ungrounded.
What then could explain this pattern? Perhaps the answer is that (1) is
a conceptual truth, and so what explains why God is wise because God
So according to Brower, God is, at least in part, omniscient in virtue of possessing certain
intellectual states and is, at least in part, good in virtue of possessing certain appetitive states.
30
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Faith and Philosophy

470

is divine, and not vice-versa, has to do with the concepts WISDOM and
DIVINITY. Consider how the concepts BACHELOR, UNMARRIED, and
MALE explain the pattern of dependency in
(3) Bill is a bachelor because Bill is an unmarried male.
BACHELOR is made up of, or composed or constituted by, UNMARRIED
and MALE, and it is precisely because of this that Bill is a bachelor because
he is an unmarried male and not the other way around. It would be conceptually incoherent to think that Bill is an unmarried male because he is
a bachelor. It is a conceptual truth that anyone who satisfies BACHELOR
does so in virtue of satisfying UNMARRIED and MALE since BACHELOR decomposes into UNMARRIED and MALE. And it is a conceptual
falsehood that anyone who satisfies UNMARRIED and MALE does so in
virtue of satisfying BACHELOR since neither UNMARRIED nor MALE
decomposes into bachelor. So the pattern of dependency exemplified in
(3) is explained by appealing to the pattern of dependency exemplified
by the concepts involved in (3). Unfortunately, this kind of explanation
will not work in our present case. After all, (2) is a conceptually coherent
claim. One could defend (2) against (1) without being confused about the
concepts WISDOM and DIVINITY. It is a live debate whether we should
accept (1) over (2), as it would not be if the disagreement over them boiled
down to a disagreement over the concepts involved (as it plausibly does
in the bachelor case). (1) is therefore not a conceptual truth. Brower agrees
when, to paraphrase him, he says that it is a real question whether the list
of divine predications (God is good, powerful, wise, just) depend on the
predication of God’s being divine, but that it is at least coherent to say that
they do.31 But it wouldn’t be a real question if (1) were a conceptual truth.
If (1) were a conceptual truth, the question would be settled decisively in
favor of (1).
Therefore, in accordance with what Brower indicates, the disagreement over whether (1) or (2) is true, which is just a disagreement over
the pattern of dependency involved, is not a disagreement over the pattern of dependency exemplified between the concepts involved. Rather,
it is a disagreement about how the world is. That is, it is not a conceptual
disagreement, but a worldly disagreement. So what explains the pattern
of dependency exemplified in (1) has to do with the world and not our
concepts of the world.
In looking to the world, an initially plausible explanation of the pattern
of dependency exemplified in (1) is the following:
(4) God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity exists.
Here, appeal is made to God’s wisdom and divinity (as worldly entities as
one can ask for). Moreover, what explains the pattern of dependency in (1)
is simply that one of these worldly entities (God’s wisdom) exists in virtue
31
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of the other (God’s divinity). The thought here is that the pattern of dependency that holds for predications is explained by that which holds for
certain worldly items. There is a certain fit of direction that exists between
the dependency of predications on predications and worldly entities on
worldly entities. That is, if x’s F-ness exists because x’s G-ness exists, then
this explains that x is F because x is G. Now this fit of direction strikes me
as quite plausible. However, and unfortunately for the proponent of DTS,
appealing to it in order to explain the pattern of dependency involved in
(1) will not do. In order to see why, recall that DTS is committed to
Simplicity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
Now it follows from the intrinsic essential predications involved in (1)
and Simplicity that God’s wisdom exists and is identical to God, and that
God’s divinity exists and is identical to God. But this, in conjunction with
(4), entails that God exists because God exists, which is false. Nothing (not
even God) can explain its own existence. Explanation is irreflexive and so
what explains God’s existence (if anything does) cannot be God’s existence.
Moreover, we should balk at the claim that God’s existence is explained
at all (even if what explains it is God’s existence). For if God is a se, then
God does not exist because of anything, a fortiori, does not exist because
of his existence.32 So, on pain of saying that God’s existence depends on itself, we cannot maintain that God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity
exist—(4) must go. So even though it is true that God is wise because God
is divine, it cannot follow that God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity
exists on pain of violating the irreflexivity of explanation and on pain of
violating God’s aseity (something the proponent of divine simplicity will
be at pains to preserve).
Is there anything left to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1)? Here the DTS theorist will most likely appeal to God. God
is what explains the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1). But this
strains credulity. How is it that God alone can explain this pattern of dependency? After all, the existence of God is clearly consistent with the
pattern of dependency expressed in (2). But then what reason is there to
say that God explains the pattern exemplified in (1) but not (2)? For the
DTS theorist, what is it about God that gives us (1) and not (2)? What is it
about God that favors accepting (1) over (2)? There must be an answer to
this. Unfortunately, given DTS’s commitment to God’s simplicity, I do not
see how there could be. If simple, God is just not structured in the right
32
I should note that the view of aseity at work here is the strong view (but is, I think, the
view of aseity that proponents of divine simplicity accept). As an anonymous referee points
out, one can understand God’s aseity as God’s existence not depending on anything (that is
how I have understood it), or one can understand it as his existence not depending on anything outside of God. If the latter, then it can be that God’s existence depends on something
so long as it depends on something else about God (say, his essence or some essential feature
of God).
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kind of way (because he is not structured at all) to explain the pattern of
dependency in (1). If simple, there can be nothing about God that favors
accepting (1) over (2). So appealing to God alone is not the answer to our
question. Instead, appeal must be made to how God is and not simply that
he is.
It is important not to confuse this worry with another worry that Brower
addresses. Here is this other worry: how can an absolutely simple thing
make true a variety of distinct predications? Brower’s response is to note
that it is at least coherent that all, save one, of God’s non-formal, intrinsic
essential predications depend for their truth on the predication that God
is divine. So, as was made clear above, according to Brower, God is good,
powerful, wise, and just because God is divine. Now since God is the
truthmaker for < God is divine >, and since explanation is transitive and
the truth of < God is divine > explains the truth of < God is good >, < God
is powerful >, < God is wise >, and < God is just >, it follows that God is
the truthmaker for all of these latter predications. So according to Brower,
there is, in principle, no problem with God making true a variety of distinct predications. Notice though that none of this even begins to explain
why the truth of < God is divine > explains the truth of < God is wise >.
Rather, Brower simply assumes that it does and uses it to deflect a potential problem with DTS. But coming up with an explanation for why the
truth of < God is divine > explains the truth of < God is wise > is precisely
the worry that this section is concerned with. It is a worry that involves
explaining, not how God can make true a variety of distinct predications
about him, but how God can explain a pattern of dependency exemplified
between distinct predications about him.
In light of all this, I am inclined to think that DTS has to take it as brute
that the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) holds.33 This is a mark
against it. As I stressed above, that one predication is true in virtue of
another predication, and not the other way around, is not a fundamental,
unexplained, fact. It is a semantic fact, and semantic facts ultimately require a ground or explanation that appeals to the non-semantic world.
However, since I cannot see what someone who accepts DTS could accept
as a plausible explanation for the pattern of dependency exemplified in
(1), then I issue the following challenge: come up with an entity (or entities) that, if it exists (or if they exist), plausibly explains the pattern of
dependency exemplified in (1).
3. Divine Truthmaker Complexity
Let us contrast DTS with another view of God which I will call Divine
Truthmaker Complexity (“DTC” for short), where DTC is the conjunction of
Truthmaker and

33
In fact, I think the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) has to be taken as brute for
any version of divine simplicity.
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Complexity: If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true,
then God’s F-ness exists and is not identical with God.
The above two arguments against DTS do not tell against DTC. Consider
what was central to the first argument, viz. that we need an adequate truthmaker for intrinsic essential predications of God. DTC has no problem
providing such truthmakers since such propositions are true in virtue
of the essential intrinsic properties God instantiates. < God is F > is true
because God’s F-ness exists, where God’s F-ness is that state of affairs or
trope of God instantiating F-ness. So DTC, unlike DTS, is not committed
to the claim that such propositions are true in virtue of God, which is
explanatorily empty.
Turning to the second argument, DTC can explain the pattern of dependency exemplified in
(1) God is wise because God is divine.
Recall the plausibility of saying that the pattern of dependency exemplified between predications is explained by the pattern of dependency
exemplified between certain worldly items. There is a certain fit of direction that exists between the dependency that holds between predications
and the dependency that holds between worldly entities. If x’s F-ness exists because x’s G-ness exists, then this explains that x is F because x is
G. Now DTC can (and should) say that God’s wisdom exists, that God’s
divinity exists, that God’s wisdom is distinct from God’s divinity, and
that God’s wisdom exists because God’s divinity exists. But then DTC has
all it needs to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1). The
pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) is explained by the pattern of
dependency in states or tropes involving how God is. So DTC, unlike DTS,
is able to provide a satisfying explanation for the pattern of dependency
exemplified in (1). DTC, unlike DTS, imports enough structure into God
in order to explain both the truth of intrinsic essential predications about
God and the pattern of dependency exemplified in certain predications
involving God.
4. Conclusion
Brower’s goal in presenting and defending DTS is to make sense of divine simplicity; his goal is to show that divine simplicity is a coherent
position.34 Moreover, Brower hopes that showing this will “help to shift
contemporary discussion of the doctrine away from questions about its
coherence to questions about its plausibility.”35 Now as I hope is clear,
this paper concedes that Brower has met his goal. The objections I have
raised against DTS do not concern its coherence but its plausibility. Divine
simplicity is, in principle, coherent. So I think that we should shift the
34
35

Brower, “Making Sense,” 20.
Ibid., 20.
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contemporary discussion away from questions of coherence to questions
of plausibility. And once we do, I think the verdict should be that divine
simplicity, as understood by Brower, is implausible. For divine simplicity
gets the facts about what God makes true wrong and is (at least as far as I
can tell) unable to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified between
certain predications about God. But no view of God should get the facts
about what God makes true wrong. No view of God should be unable to
explain the pattern of dependency exemplified between certain predications about God. So even if we grant, as I do, that divine simplicity is
coherent, I do not think we should grant that it is plausible. Whatever
merits divine simplicity has, I doubt that plausibility is one of them.36
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